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GENERALIZED COST-ANALYSIS OF SCREENING PROGRAMS 
 








Nowadays, there is a growing interest about including indirect costs of 
health care programs in economic evaluations. In this paper, we provide a 
generalized cost-analysis of screening programs and propose a technique to 
measure production gains associated with these programs. We apply this 
technique to show evidence in favor of implementing a newborn screening 
program to detect congenital hearing impairment. 
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JEL classification numbers: I12, I18. 1 Introduction
Screening has been deﬁned as the systematic application of a test to identify
individuals at suﬃcient risk of a speciﬁc disorder to warrant further inves-
tigation or direct preventive action, among persons who have not sought
medical attention on account of symptoms of that disorder (cf. Jepson et al.
2000). It can be an eﬀective method of reducing morbidity and mortality
from disease by detecting it before symptoms occur. On the other hand, it
is expensive and can divert resources from other health care programs.
A large medical and epidemiological literature documents controversy
over appropriate recommendations about screening for most preventable dis-
eases like prostate cancer, breast cancer or congenital hearing impairment
(see Byrne & Thompson (2001), Herrero & Moreno-Ternero (2003), Wu
(2003) and the literature cited therein). Among the most important caveats
of this literature is the systematic circumvention of the computation of in-
direct costs associated with screening programs, that might be one of the
reasons of the reigning aforementioned controversy. Furthermore, this is
in stark contrast with the recent guidelines in cost-eﬀectiveness analysis
(“CEA” hereafter), where a broad agreement seems to be growing to include
indirect costs and beneﬁts (e.g., Drummond et al. (1997), Garber (2000),
Gold et al. (1996), Olsen & Richardson (1999)).
The aim of this paper is to develop a generalized model that fully de-
scribes all sort of costs (direct and indirect ones) associated with screening
programs. In particular, we address the computation of costs falling else-
where in the public sector, the so-called production costs. It is well accepted
that, in the context of collectively ﬁnanced health systems, not only costs
derived from health care resources consumed but also resources consumed
in other sectors should be computed, if society is prepared to consider them
in its assessment of health care services. Traditionally, the human capital
method was used for measuring these costs. Roughly speaking, this method
approximates the production costs associated with a disease by the aggrega-
tion of the gross earnings an individual would have received if he would have
not suﬀered from the disease. The friction cost method (e.g., Brouwer et al.
(1997b), Koopmanschap et al. (1995)) is a step beyond in the sense that
other realistic situations that are not tackled in the human capital method,
like unemployment, are considered to calculate productivity costs. In this
paper, we present a method to compute production costs and beneﬁts of
screening programs that contemplates a new feature. The feature is that of
disentangling the eﬀect of circumstances (aspects that are beyond the control
of a person but that aﬀect her pursuit of welfare) and eﬀort (to be under-
stood as those aspects that also inﬂuence a person’s welfare but that are
2not captured by circumstances) in the outcomes of individual earnings. To
our viewpoint, the earnings gap due to a disease is well computed only if we
compare the earnings of an impaired person with the earnings of a healthy
person that has the same remaining circumstances and has expended the
same relative degree of eﬀort.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the
preliminaries. In Section 3, we describe all direct (health service) costs of
screening programs. We present in Section 4 our new technique to compute
the indirect (non-health service) costs and an elicitation method for it. In
Section 5, we apply the model to study the adequacy of implementing a
newborn screening program to detect congenital hearing impairment. Finally,
we conclude in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
Let d be a particular disease. Assume that there exist precursors of d such
that, if detected before the development of symptoms and treated adequately,
might alleviate the consequences of it, even leading to its eradication. Typ-
ical examples of d are some congenital impairments (e.g., hearing disor-
ders, phenylketonuria) or some cancers (e.g., prostate or breast cancer). Let
Γ = {1,...,n} be the corresponding target population of individuals suscepti-
ble of suﬀering the disease d. For instance, if d refers to a congenital disease
then Γ typically refers to a cohort of newborns. Individual status with re-
spect to d is either 0 (if the individual is healthy) or 1 (if the individual is
impaired).
Every health care policy concerning the ﬁght against d involves two stages:
detection and treatment. In the former stage impaired individuals are iden-
tiﬁed. In the latter one, they are treated and the probability of being cured
depends on the early (or late) detection. Early (late) detection occurs when
impaired individuals are identiﬁed before (after) they develop symptoms of
the disease. Usually, early detection is thanks to a screening program, since
under conventional management individuals (or their parents, in the case of
newborns) consult their general practitioner once they develop symptoms of
the disease. Only then, they are referred to a hospital outpatient department
for tests and treated if the tests are positive. We assume that the type of
management (screening or conventional) does not aﬀect the treatment given.
It only aﬀects the probability of a cure.
32.1 Screening
Screening is traditionally deﬁned as testing a population of asymptomatic
individuals to identify precursors of a disease. The subjects who test positive
are sent on for further evaluation in a subsequent diagnostic test to determine
whether they do, in fact, have the disease. Consequently, individuals screened
can be partitioned into groups according to whether they do or do not have
the disease and whether the screening tests are positive or negative. There
are four groups of screened individuals: true positives, those whom the screen
correctly indicates to have the disease; false positives,t h o s ew h od on o th a v e
the disease but who have a positive screening test; false negatives,t h o s ew h o
have the disease but are mistakenly cleared by the screen; and true negatives,
those who do not have the disease and have a negative screen. As Table 1
shows, the probabilities of an individual being in one of the four groups can be
expressed in terms of characteristics of the population (prevalence) and of the
detection ability of the screening test (sensitivity and speciﬁcity). Prevalence
is the probability of an individual in the population being impaired, and is
measured as ρ=TP+FN
n -the ratio of the number with disease (true positives
and false negatives) to the total number of individuals. The sensitivity of
the screening test (ε) is the ability of the test to identify correctly those who
have the disease, i.e., the conditional probability that an individual with the
disease is positively detected by the test. This is estimated by the ratio of
true positives to total impaired individuals ( TP
TP+FN). The speciﬁcity of the
test (φ)i sd e ﬁned as its ability to identify correctly those who do not have the
disease, i.e., the conditional probability of an individual without the disease
being correctly detected as negative in the test. This is measured by the ratio
of true negatives to the number of disease-free individuals ( TN
FP+TN). Using
these deﬁnitions, the probability of an individual being a true negative is the
probability that he does not have the disease (1 − ρ) times the probability
that the screening correctly indicates that he does not have the disease (φ).
The probabilities of the individual to be a true positive (ρε), a false positive
((1 − ρ)(1 − φ)) and a false negative (ρ(1 − ε)) can be similarly expressed.
The advantage of this way of writing the screening probabilities is that it
makes easier to assess the implications of variations in the parameters ρ, ε
or φ separately.
Obviously it would be desirable to have a screening test that is both
highly sensitive and highly speciﬁc. This is not usually possible, and there
is generally a trade-oﬀ between the sensitivity and speciﬁcity of any given
screening test. Screening is often carried out in stages. Normally, a less
expensive, less invasive, or less uncomfortable test is carried out ﬁrst, and
those who screen positive on this test are recalled for further testing with
4a more expensive or more invasive test, which may have greater sensitivity
and speciﬁcity. It is hoped that bringing back for further testing those who
screen positive will reduce the problem of false positives.
Table 1: Impairment status and screening results
Status
Test Positive Negative Total
Positive TP FP TP + FP
Negative FN TN FN+ TN
Total TP + FN FP + TN n = TP + FP + FN+ TN
Prevalence: ρ=TP+FN
n ; Sensitivity: ε= TP
TP+FN; Speciﬁcity: φ = TN
FP+TN;
2.2 Conventional management
The alternative to screening is conventional management. Under conven-
tional management individuals who develop symptoms of the disease are re-
ferred by their general practitioners to hospital for examination (diagnostic
test).
Conventional management therefore deﬁnes three groups of individuals;
t h o s ew h oh a v et h ed i s e a s e ;t h o s ew h od on o tb u ta r ee x a m i n e d ;a n dt h o s e
who do not have disease and do not request a test or examination. Following
Gravelle et al. (1982), these groups will be referred to as conventional dis-
eases, worried wells and unworried wells, respectively. The probability of an
individual being in a particular group deﬁned by conventional management
can be expressed in terms of the prevalence ρ and the worried well proportion
w (the conditional probability that a well individual develops symptoms is
tested and cleared). More precisely, whilst the probability of an individual
being a conventional disease is simply the prevalence (ρ), the probability
of an individual being a worried well is the probability that he does not
have the disease (1 − ρ) times the worried well proportion (w). Similarly,
the probability of the individual to be a unworried well is (1 − ρ)(1− w).
We assume that under conventional management all individuals with dis-
ease present symptomatically are tested and then treated when the tests are
positive.
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53 Health service costs
The eﬀect on national health service costs of screening an individual will be
the cost of screening (including the costs of further tests and treatment) less
the cost that would have been incurred had he been conventionally managed.
The cost of screening an individual will be the sum of the costs associated
with each group (true positives, false positives, false positives and true nega-
tives) multiplied by the probability of an individual being in the group. The
cost of managing an individual conventionally is the probability weighted
sum of the costs of the three groups that deﬁne (conventional diseases, wor-
ried wells and unworried wells). Thus, in order to measure the eﬀect on
health service costs of screening an individual rather than managing him
conventionally we estimate the costs associated with the seven groups and
their respective probabilities.
Three main types of costs are incurred by the health service: the cost of
the screening tests, the cost of the diagnostic tests and the cost of treating
the disease. These costs will generally diﬀer for the seven groups deﬁned
by the screening and conventional management strategies. Let ci denote the
health care sector (direct) costs associated with each group. Then,
ci = σi + δi + τi,
where σi, δi and τi denote the cost of the screening test, the cost of the
diagnostic test and the cost of the treatment in the ith group, respectively.
They are described next.
1. True positives: Individuals in this group are screened, tested in hos-
pital and treated. Thus, c1 = σ1 + δ1 + τ1.
2. False positives: In this group, they are screened, tested in hospital
and cleared, so c2 = σ2 + δ2,a sτ2 =0 .
3. False negatives: These individuals are screened, mistakenly cleared
by the screen, but later during the disease gestation period develop
symptoms, are tested in hospital and treated, i.e., c3 = σ3 + δ3 + τ3.
The hospital test and treatment costs might diﬀer from those for true
positives because they are incurred later, and so should be discounted.
False negatives are also likely to be diagnosed and treated at a later
stage of the disease and this might inﬂu e n c et r e a t m e n tc o s t sa sw e l l .
4. True negatives: They are screened and require no further tests, i.e.,
c4 = σ4,a sδ4 = τ4 =0 .
65. Conventional diseases: In this group, individuals are not screened.
Once they present symptoms, they are tested in hospital and treated.
In other words, c5 = δ5 + τ5,a sσ5 =0 . These costs might diﬀer from
the hospital test and treatment costs for true positives, as they usually
arise later.
6. Worried wells: They are not screened but present symptoms through
the gestation period and are then tested in hospital and cleared. Then,
c6 = δ6,a sσ6 = τ6 =0 . The hospital test costs might also diﬀer from
those for false positives because of discounting.
7. Unworried wells: In this group, there are no health service costs, i.e.,
c7 =0 .
We assume that the screen test cost is the same for the four groups
deﬁned by screening, i.e., σi = σ for all i =1 ,...,4, but permit the hospital
and treatment costs to diﬀer across the seven groups. Among them, it is
usually assumed, because of discounting and late detection, that
δ1 = δ2 ≤ δ3 = δ5 = δ6,a n d
τ1 ≤ τ5 = τ3
Thus, following this notation and the formulae in Section 2, the expected
incremental direct costs of introducing a screening, with respect to conven-
tional management are
C
D = ρ · (ε · c1 +( 1− ε) · c3 − c5)+( 1− ρ) · ((1 − φ) · c2 + φ · c4 − w · c6).
4 Non-health service costs
Section 3 concentrates on the eﬀect of screening on national health service
costs. We now move to the costs falling elsewhere in the public sector, the so-
called production costs. In this section, we present a new method to compute
production costs and beneﬁts of screening programs that disentangles the
eﬀect of circumstances and eﬀort in the outcomes of individual earnings.
Consider some circumstances for which society should not held responsi-
ble individuals in a population. One could think that circumstances are, for
instance, the gender, the race, the parental socioeconomic status, the level
of formal education attained by parents, and so on. Each individual in the
population in question is therefore identiﬁed by society with a proﬁle of cir-
cumstances. Let T be the resulting set of types in which the population is
partitioned, where a type consists of all individuals who have the same set of
7circumstances. Within each type we distinguish those individuals who have
the disease d from those who do not. Formally, for all T ∈ T , T = T0 ∪ T1
where T0 (T1) denotes the set of individuals in type T that are healthy (im-
paired) with respect to the disease d.W ed e n o t eb yρt t h ep r e v a l e n c eo ft h e
disease among individuals sharing the proﬁle of circumstances of type T, i.e.,
the probability of being in the set T1.1
The population partition {Tk : T ∈ T ; k ∈ {0,1}} typically changes
depending on whether conventional management or a screening program is
implemented. Denote by Tm
k (resp. Ts
k) the group of individuals with the
proﬁle of circumstances of type T and disease status k ∈ {0,1}, after the
treatment, when conventional management (resp. a screening program) has
been implemented. Then, {Tm
k : T ∈ T ; k ∈ {0,1}} and {Ts
k : T ∈ T ;
k ∈ {0,1}} are the resulting population partitions after implementing con-
ventional management and a screening program respectively.
Let αt (resp. α0
t) denote the probability of a cure, for an individual of type
T, when the treatment is carried out after an early (resp. late) detection.
We may assume, without loss of generality, that αt ≥ α0
t for each T ∈ T .I t
is then straightforward to show that the probability of being in the set Tm
1
is ρt · (1 − α0
t). Similarly, If ρs
t denotes the probability of being in Ts
1,a n d
assuming that the sensitivity of the screening program does not depend on
the individual circumstances, it is straightforward to show that
ρ
s
t = ρt · (ε · (1 − αt)+( 1− ε) · (1 − α
0
t)),( 1 )
where ε is the sensitivity of the screening program.2
4.1 Description of potential social earnings
In order to describe our method, we need to handle earnings distributions.
To do so, we follow the so-called Parade approach (e.g., Cowell (2000)). This
approach can be easily illustrated as follows. Consider two Cartesian axis.
Along the horizontal axis, we measure proportions of the population π and
earnings e along the vertical axis. The population is arranged in ascending
order of earnings and the earnings distribution is given by the pattern com-
posed by all points (π,eπ),w h e r eeπ gives the earnings of the person who
has exactly a fraction π of the population below her. The usefulness of this
approach comes from the fact that statistical concepts can be used and we
can compute in an easier way the earnings loss of an impaired individual,
that is only attributable to the disease.
1Note that ρt =
|T1|











n ,w h e r e|Tm
1 | and |Ts
1| denote the number of




Figure 1: Earnings Distribution
For all T ∈ T denote by mt
0(·) and mt
1(·) the cumulative distribution
functions of the earnings distribution in Tm
0 and Tm
1 , respectively. Let x ∈ Tm
1
be an impaired individual after conventional management, and ex denote his
earnings. Let πx be the fraction of the population in Tm
1 with lower earnings
than him. In other words, x is the πth
x quantile of the earnings distribution







Now, denote by ex the πth
x quantile of the earnings distribution in Tm
0 .I n
other words, ex is the amount of earnings that would leave below in Tm
0 the
same fraction of the population than ex in Tm
1 , i.e.,











We shall identify the degree of a person’s eﬀort with her quantile on the
earnings distribution of her group. It is then plausible to think that ex would
have been the earnings of individual x in case he would not have suﬀered the
disease, as this only presupposes that the degree of eﬀort expended would
be the same in both groups, if the remaining circumstances are identical.
individuals in the set Tm
1 and Ts
1 respectively.
3A quantile is a rank on a distribution normalized to be in the interval [0,1].I ti st h e
inﬁnitesimal version of the discrete analogue of centile.
9Thus, the earnings loss of individual x attributable to the disease would
be ex − ex. The aggregation of these individual earnings losses is what we
call the production loss associated with d, under conventional management.
Formally:
Deﬁnition 1 We deﬁne the (per capita) production loss associated with












A similar process can be done for the case in which a screening program,
rather than conventional management, has been implemented. Formally, for
all T ∈ T denote by st
0(·) and st
1(·) the cumulative distribution functions of
the earnings distribution in Ts
0 and Ts
1.L e tx ∈ Ts
1 be an impaired individual
after implementing a screening program, and ex denote his earnings. Let πx
be the fraction of the population in Ts
1 with lower earnings than him. In
other words, x is the πth








Now, denote by ex the πth
x quantile of the earnings distribution in Ts
0.I n
other words, ex is the amount of earnings that would leave below in Ts
0 the
same fraction of the population than ex in Ts
1, i.e.,











Deﬁnition 2 We deﬁne the (per capita) production loss associated with












Finally, the potential social earnings associated with s are simply given
by the diﬀerence between both production losses. Formally:




10Thus, the expected incremental indirect costs of introducing a screening,
with respect to conventional management, are simply the potential social





It is worth noting that the notion of potential social earnings is disentan-
gling the eﬀect of the disease, and other circumstances, with that of eﬀort on
individual earnings. In like manner, our proposal is a step beyond the stan-
dard human capital method and the friction cost method. It amounts to a
more accurate measure of production gains and losses for screening programs.
4.2 A proxy for the elicitation of potential social earn-
ings
The exact computation of potential social earnings would require the follow-
up of two comparable populations; one of them under conventional manage-
ment and the other one under the implementation of a screening program.
This might not be feasible in some cases and therefore we ask ourselves which
would be the best proxy for that, without the follow-up and when the only
data that exist are the actual earnings distributions of the healthy and im-
paired population, with respect to the disease d. A natural course of action
to solve this question is described in the following paragraphs.
We ﬁrst estimate the current earnings gap that exists between a healthy
and an impaired individual, sharing a particular proﬁle of circumstances.
The (per capita) production loss associated with d, under conventional man-
agement (resp. a screening program) could then be obtained as the weighted
aggregation of these gaps, with weights equal to the probability of being in
each of the corresponding groups of impaired individuals in the population
partition {Tm
1 : T ∈ T}(resp. {Ts
1 : T ∈ T} ).
Formally, let ξt be the estimation of the current existing earnings gap
between an impaired individual and a healthy individual, in type T. Then,
the estimation of the (per capita) production loss associated with d,u n d e r










n denotes the probability of being in the set Tm
1 .
Similarly, the estimation of the (per capita) production loss associated with










n denotes the probability of being in the set Ts
1.N o w ,m a k i n g





















ξt · (ρt · (1 − α
0












where ρt is the probability of being in type T, αt and α0
t are the probabilities of
a cure, after early or late detection of the disease, for an individual belonging
to type T,a n dε is the sensitivity of the screening program.
Thus, we have provided with an outcome measure as a proxy of the
potential social earnings that the screening of a particular disease provides.








· ε.( 2 )
It is worth noting that the only screening method-speciﬁci n f o r m a t i o n
that we need to compute this outcome measure is the sensitivity of the screen-
ing program. The outcome measure is indeed a constant factor (that is not
screening method-speciﬁc) multiplied by the sensitivity of the screening pro-
gram. Moreover, the constant factor only depends on the estimation of the
earnings gap between impaired and healthy individuals (ξt), the prevalence
within each type (ρt) and the probabilities of successful improvement (αt and
α0
t). Without loss of generality, one might assume that ξt ≥ 0.S i n c ew eh a v e
also assumed that αt ≥ α0
t, then the constant factor is non-negative. As a re-
sult, and according to this proxy, screening programs for a particular disease
could be ranked according to their potential social earnings (indirect costs)
just by computing their sensitivity levels. Finally, notice that the value of
the proxy depends on the probabilities of improvement, with or without a
previous screening: the higher the diﬀerence between them, the higher the
potential social earnings, as expected.
To conclude with this section, we provide with a concrete expression for
ξt. A gross one could be the diﬀerence between the mean earnings in both




0 e·dt1(e),w h e r et0(·) and t1(·)
denote the cumulative distribution functions of the earnings distributions in
T0 and T1. Following the spirit of our model, we propose a more accurate
one to reﬂect the eﬀect of individual eﬀort.
12Formally, ﬁxs o m eﬁnite set ∆ ⊂ [0,1].F o re a c hπ ∈ ∆, k ∈ {0,1} and
T ∈ T ,w ed e n o t eb yeπ
tk the πth quantile of the earnings distribution in Tk.
In other words, eπ
tk is such that π =
R eπ
tk
0 dtk. Then, consider the following














where |∆| means the cardinality of ∆.4
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the error incurred by proxy (2) in
estimating potential social earnings would be zero, under the assumption
that the earnings distribution of impaired individuals of each type would be
a translation of the earnings distribution of healthy individuals in the same
type. This would mean that the existing earnings gap between impaired and
healthy individuals, with the remaining circumstances identical, is constant
across degrees of relative eﬀort, although it might vary depending on the
proﬁle of circumstances. We acknowledge that this assumption is not likely
to be fulﬁlled.
5T o t a l c o s t s
The guidelines of the US Panel on CEA in health and medicine recommend
incorporating indirect costs in the denominator of a cost-eﬀectiveness ratio
(“C/E ratio” hereafter) (cf. Gold et al. (1996)). This recommendation
generated a debate between the so-called “Erasmus group” and the members
of the Panel (cf. Brouwer et al. (1997a), Brouwer et al. (1997b), Weinstein
et al. (1997)). The main criticism is that only direct health related eﬀects on
quality of life that cannot be meaningfully monetarized should be considered
as health eﬀects. Nowadays, it seems to be accepted that production costs
and production gains should be included in the numerator of a C/E ratio (cf.
Garber (2000), Olsen and Richardson (1999)). Thus, following our model in
Sections 3 and 4, the total cost function, or equivalently, the numerator of
the C/E ratio, of a screening program could be expressed as follows:
C = ρ((c1 − c3)ε +( c3 − c5))+(1−ρ)((c4 − c2)φ +( c2 − wc6))+(ζ
s −ζ
m).
If, moreover, we use proxy (2) to elicit potential social earnings, then we have
C = λ · ε + µ · φ + ν,( 4 )
4We could also have been more precise by introducing a continuum set of quantiles,








· dπ, for all T ∈ T .
13where
λ = ρ · (c1 − c3)+
X
T∈T
ξt · ρt · (αt − α
0
t),
µ =( 1− ρ) · (c4 − c2),
and
ν = ρ · (c3 − c5)+( 1− ρ) · (c2 − w · c6).
If (4) is negative, i.e., if screening reduces total costs with respect to
conventional management, the work involved in evaluating screening would
be much reduced. Although there would be some uncertainty about the
precise magnitudes of the reductions in morbidity and mortality arising from
earlier detection of a disease, the beneﬁts are almost always certainly positive.
Thus if the expression is negative there is no need for a measure of beneﬁt,
as screening could be justiﬁed solely as a cost reducing innovation.
6 Application: The case of congenital hear-
ing impairment
We conclude by applying our model to the case of congenital hearing im-
pairment. The hearing impairment satisﬁes all the medical requirements to
impose a prevention program, based on a newborn screening protocol. First
of all, it is a serious disease, for which a lack of early diagnosis will cause
problems in language acquisition. Signiﬁcant hearing loss interferes with the
development of speech perception abilities needed for later language learning.
These impairments in communication skills can lead to learning disabilities
and ultimately, to limitations in career opportunities. Moreover, it is more
frequent than other impairments for which newborn screening programs are
in use in developed countries. Finally, there are reliable screening methods,
with high levels of sensitivity and speciﬁcity, and there is also an eﬀective
treatment available (cf. Joint Committee on Infant Hearing (2000)).
In all these arguments that appear in the medical literature, the economic
aspect is surprisingly ignored. In this section, we apply our model to show
the adequacy of implementing a newborn hearing screening program from
an economic perspective. We consider two circumstances: the congenital
hearing impairment status itself and the gender. Due to the lack of available
data to apply our model directly, we consider the proxy described in Section
4.2 to obtain potential social earnings.
We consider some conservative assumptions in our model that favor con-
ventional management rather than the implementation of a screening pro-
gram. We shall see that, even in this less favorable framework, there is
14enough evidence to support the implementation of a screening program. The
assumptions are the following. First, the diagnostic and treatment costs are
not increased if they are carried out later. Note that, on average, under con-
ventional management newborns receive diagnostic test and treatment later
than under screening management. Second, we assume that the worried
wells proportion is zero, i.e., no well individual is tested under conventional
management.
Table 3 shows the necessary data for our analysis. In what follows, the
reader is referred to Kemper and Downs (2000), Keren et al. (2002) or
Kezirian et al. (2001), for additional information about these data. All costs
were adjusted to 2001 US dollars. Future costs were discounted at a rate of
3% per year, as recommended by the Panel on Cost-Eﬀectiveness in Health
and Medicine (cf. Gold et al. (1996)). The screening cost comprises machine
costs, supplies and wages of the specialists. Each machine has a cost which
is amortized over 3 years. Supplies include probe tips, probes and machine
calibration. We also include here tracking software cost.
Table 3:D a t a
Parameters Mean Range
Prevalence (ρ) 0.0021 [0.001,0.006]
Sensitivity (ε) 0.86 [0.64,0.95]
Speciﬁcity (φ) 0.97 [0.93,1]
Screening cost (σ) $9.52 [$7.5,$12]
Diagnostic test cost (δ) $280 [$150,$540]
Men’s earnings gap (ξm) $40360 [$30010,$62235]
Women’s earnings gap (ξw) $99480 [$71485,$111400]
No satisfactory database including information about earnings distribu-
tions within the population of individuals with hearing impairment exists, to
the best of our knowledge. For this reason, we used as a proxy the earnings
distributions of disabled individuals, which were obtained from the European
Community Household Panel (ECHP) relative to Spain. In particular, we
obtained from the ECHP the deciles of four earnings distributions: disabled
women, disabled men, non-disabled women and non-disabled men. With
these data, we applied (3) to obtain an estimation of the earnings gap for
both men and women over the whole working period (from 16 to 65 years
old). The corresponding values are also shown in the last rows of Table 3.
Finally, we suppose that every impaired infant receives treatment, having
a probability α (α0) of success if the impairment was early (late) detected.
Note that we do not distinguish between these probabilities when they refer
to women or men. There is no evidence in the medical literature to reject
15this assumption (e.g., Joint Committee on Infant Hearing (2000), Thompson
et al. (2001)). Thus, according to (4), the total cost function is given by
C = σ +( 1− ρ) · (1 − φ) · δ + ρ · (α − α
0) ·b ξ · ε,
where b ξ = 1
2 · (ξm + ξw). Upon replacing the mean values shown in Table 3,
it is obtained that if α − α0 ≥ 0.142 then the total cost of implementing a
screening program would be negative. That is, if the probability of a cure
after early detection is about 15% higher than after late detection, a screening
program would save with respect to conventional management.
Univariate sensitivity analyses show that this base-case estimate is quite
robust to changes in most of the key parameters and costs. The only two
variables to which the model was moderately sensitive were the speciﬁcity of
the screening program and the prevalence of congenital hearing impairment.
More precisely, by varying the speciﬁcity within its conﬁdence interval, the
threshold for the diﬀerence in probabilities would change from 0.075 to 0.23.
Similarly, as the prevalence varied within its conﬁdence interval, the threshold
changed from 0.05 to 0.298. The ranges of thresholds provided by all the
remaining variables are closer to the base-case estimate.
Although there would be some uncertainty about the precise magnitudes
of the reductions in morbidity arising from earlier detection of congenital
hearing impairment, the beneﬁts are certainly positive and α−α0 ≥ 0.142 is
a fairly plausible assumption (e.g., Thompson et al. (2001)). Therefore, the
implementation of a newborn hearing screening program could be justiﬁed
solely as a cost reducing innovation, without requiring the time-consuming
task of measuring the beneﬁts associated with these programs. The evidence
in favor of a screening program would be even clearer under less conservative
assumptions than the ones we considered here. For instance, assuming a
non-negative worried wells proportion, or discounting costs of late diagnos-
tic and treatment, the resulting base-case estimate of the threshold for the
probabilities would be even lower.
To conclude, it is also worth mentioning that there is a particular feature
of this problem that we did not consider. Usually, the treatment of congenital
hearing impairment is complemented with a period of special education for
impaired infants. It has been argued in the literature (e.g., Grant (2000))
that a screening program provides savings in special education with respect
to conventional management. Thus, including this aspect would favor even
more the implementation of a screening program.
167 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have developed a model that fully describes all sort of costs
associated with screening programs. In order to compute non-health service
costs, we presented a new method that disentangles the eﬀect of eﬀort and
the eﬀect of circumstances on individual earnings. We have also applied
our model to the particular case of congenital hearing impairment showing
that there exists strong support for the implementation of a newborn hearing
screening program.
A comment with respect to the computation of non-health service costs
(potential social earnings) that we presented is in order. We have considered
a utilitarian approach to the aggregation of individual earnings losses. This
approach was mainly adopted for simplicity. However, we admit that in so
doing, we are implicitly assuming the value judgement that all individual
earnings losses are equally valuable. There might be reasons for rejecting
this value judgement. For instance, one might argue that rich individuals
should be weighted diﬀerently than poor individuals in the aggregation of
earnings losses. The literature on social choice and welfare provides with
several other aggregation methods reﬂecting some of these value judgements
that could be considered. We think that exploring this approach in detail
would be beyond the scope of this paper.
To conclude, we acknowledge that our method is inspired by the recent
theory of Equality of Opportunity developed by Roemer (1998) and it could be
interpreted as an application of that theory to a health care context. Roughly
speaking, Roemer’s theory implies that the eﬀects of the disadvantageous
circumstances, beyond the individual’s control on his pursuit of welfare, are
neutralized, so that the outcome a person eventually achieves is due only
to his eﬀort or autonomous choices, where autonomous choice is taken to
circumscribe those aspects of a person’s behavior which are not determined
by circumstance. This implies that individual outcomes may justiﬁably diﬀer,
if they are due only to diﬀerential eﬀort or choice, but not if they are due to
diﬀerential circumstances. In a health care context, equality of opportunity
is a conceptualization of equity in the allocation of health care resources. It
holds individuals partially responsible for the quality of life-style that they
live, in so far as it aﬀects their health, but compensates individuals for the
eﬀect on health of circumstances beyond their control. In particular, assume
that society implements an equality of opportunity policy à la Roemer and
that the objective for which society wants to equalize opportunities is the
earning power of individuals. According to this, every impaired individual
that has lower earnings just due to a disease for which they should not be held
responsible, should be compensated. The aggregation of these compensations
17can be seen as a loss associated with the disease. This loss could be alleviated
by introducing a screening program (instead of conventional management).
The magnitude of the reduction in the loss is precisely what we have described
as the potential social earnings a screening program oﬀers.
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